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EQUIVALENT DETERRENCE: A PROPOSED
ALTERNATIVE TO THE EXCLUSIONARY
RULE IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
by Robert M. Hardaway*
I.

INTRODUCTION

"If an effective alternative is available, [existing law] does not
require adherence to the exclusionary rule."
Chief Justice Warren Burger dissenting
in Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the
Federal Bureau of Narcotics (1971)
Perhaps no other area of American jurisprudence is as controversial as the exclusionary rule.1 Rejected by all other civilized
countries2 and held in contempt by much of the American pub* Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law; B.A., Amherst College,
1968; J.D., New York University Law School, 1971, Cum Laude; Order of Coif.
1. Evolution of the exclusionary rule began in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616
(1886), which held that forced disclosure of papers "as evidence against him in a proceeding to forfeit his property" in a federal civil case violated the fourth amendment
and was inadmissible as evidence. Id. at 622. The rule was formally adopted in the
criminal case of Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), when Justice Day stated:
The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment,
praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great
principles established by years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted
in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.
Id. at 393. The Court went on to decide that the admission of evidence illegally seized
by a federal officer is a separate violation of the fourth amendment.
In Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), the Court refused to require states to adopt
the exclusionary rule as a remedy for fourth amendment violations. The Court concluded the Bill of Rights was not applicable to the administration of criminal justice in
state courts through the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Wolf
decision was overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), when the Court found
the right of privacy and the exclusionary rule were enforceable against the states
through the Due Process Clause. Consequently, the exclusionary rule became an established procedural rule to be debated and challenged for years to come.
2. Ranney, The Exclusionary Rule The Illusion v. The Reality, 46 MONT. L. REV.
289, 305 (1985) ("no other country on earth uses an approach that is on its face as
absurd as the Mapp v. Ohio exclusionary rule"); see also Wilkey, The Exclusionary
Rule.- Why Suppress Valid Evidence?, 62 JUDICATURE 214 (1978). Wilkey states:
[Piroof of the irrationality of the exclusionary rule is that no other civilized
nation in the world has adopted it. If there were merit in any of the grounds
advanced in support of the rule, at least one other country would have emulated our 65-year-old example. All have shunned it.
Id. at 216.
Countries with similar judicial systems to the United States such as England, Israel,
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lic,3 the rule reached its zenith during the Warren Court,4 only to
be chipped away a little at a time by the Burger Court.5 Indeed, if
and the British Commonwealth nations, use either a civil tort remedy or a system where
the executive branch disciplines its own people. Wilkey, ConstitutionalAlternatives To
The Exclusionary Rule, 23 S. TEX. L.J. 531, 583 (1982). See also Spiotto, The Search
And Seizure Problem-Two Approaches: The Canadian Tort Remedy and the U.S. Exclusionary Rule, 1 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 36 (1973).
3. Starkman, The Exclusionary Rule: An Illinois Alternative, 63 CHI. B. REC. 296
(1982) (The United States is the only country which follows this rule, resulting in diminished public respect for the judicial process.) See also Hall, The Alternatives To The
Exclusionary Rule, 3 CRIM. JUST. J. 303, 309 (1980) (lack of public confidence in our
judicial process as a cost of enforcing the exclusionary rule); Hanscom, Admissibility of
Illegally Seized Evidence in Civil Cases: Could This Be the Path Out of the Labyrinth of
the Exclusionary Rule?, 9 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 799 (1982) (exclusionary rule is baffling
to police agencies as well as erosive of the public's confidence in the legal system).
4. The Warren Court began its construction of the exclusionary rule with Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960). It rejected the "silver platter" doctrine which
would have allowed evidence illegally seized by state authorities to be used by federal
authorities. The Court then continued to impose heavy procedural requirements on the
police with the landmark decision of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). With Mapp,
the Court "elevated the exclusionary rule to the status of constitutionally based law."
Comment, The "Bad Faith" Exception To the Exclusionary Rule United States v. Karo,
31 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 345, 354 (1986). In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1968),
the Warren Court expanded the purpose of the exclusionary rule by stating it served not
only as a deterrent, but also provided an imperative element of judicial integrity.
5. "[T]he Burger Court has rejected the premise that the exclusionary rule is either
constitutionally mandated or an effective method of preserving judicial integrity."
Comment, supra note 4, at 354. Since his time with the court of appeals, Former Chief
Justice Burger had been an outspoken advocate of changing the exclusionary rule. He
felt disciplinary action against the offending officer may be an alternative. Members of
the Burger Court rallied to overturn Mapp but failed to get a majority. C. WOODWARD
& W. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN, 113-19 (1979). See United States v. Calandra,
414 U.S. 338 (1974). The Burger Court stated the purpose of the rule "is not to redress
the injury to the privacy of the search victim . . . [but to] . . .deter future unlawful
police conduct." Id. at 347. Judicial integrity was not addressed by the majority in
Calandra. Justice Brennan in dissent stated:
For the first time, the Court today discounts to the point of extinction the vital
function of the rule to insure that the judiciary avoid even the slightest appearance of sanctioning illegal government conduct. This rejection of "the imperative of judicial integrity,"[citation omitted] openly invites "[tihe conviction
that all government is staffed by ... hypocrites [, a conviction] easy to instill
and difficult to erase." [citation omitted]
Id. at 360.
This emphasis upon deterrence resulted in application of the rule only in situations
where exclusion would serve the goal of deterring unlawful police conduct. In United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), the Court stated, "The Fourth Amendment contains no provision precluding the use of evidence obtained in violation of its commands
....' Id. at 906. By omitting any discussion of judicial integrity and by approving the
"good faith" exception, the Court implied the rule is not designed to
deter the errors of
judges and magistrates who issue warrants without probable cause.
See also Bass, The Erosion of the Exclusionary Rule Under the Burger Court, 33 BAYLOR L. REV. 363 (1981).
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the rule is ever to die, it seems destined to go out with a whimper
rather than a bang.
The very nature of the exclusionary rule appears to fly in the
face of the oft-quoted legal maxim that "the law is not an ass."
Trying to explain to a citizen of any other civilized country why a
murderer must go free because, as Justice Cardozo aptly observed,
"the constable has blundered," 6 usually produces only incredulity.7
There is considerable scholarly criticism of the rule, as well as
valiant defense by those alarmed by what they see as its inexorable
demise.8 The societal costs of exclusion have been so thoroughly
discussed, analyzed and catalogued that they have now been indexed and reduced to the seemingly magic number of twelve. 9 The
major ones (the criminal goes free, the wrong party is "punished,"'"
"the burden on the trial courts is demonstrated and undeniable," 1
respect for the courts is diminished,' 2 internal police disciplinary
6. People v. DeFore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587, cert. denied, 270 U.S. 657
(1926).
7. "[N]on-lawyers usually find it difficult to grasp why it has been necessary to preclude evidence or overturn the conviction of someone plainly guilty of a serious crime,
on a 'technicality'," when the result is the undermining of the moral stature of the law.
Blumberg, The Case Against the Exclusionary Rule, 14 HUM. RTS. 41, 47 (1987).
8. One look at the Index to Legal Periodicals reveals the vast amount of literature on
the exclusionary rule as well as the many separate topic listings which focus on specific
issues of the rule.
9. Twelve recognized costs to the American people and the justice system are: 1) the
criminal goes free; 2) the guilty benefit "while innocent victims of illegal searches have
neither protection nor remedy"; 3) the rule "vitiates all internal disciplinary efforts by
law enforcement agencies"; 4) the rule puts "an unnecessary and intolerable burden on
the court system"; 5) the rule "forces the Judiciary to perform the Executive's job of
disciplining its employees"; 6) "[t]he misplaced burden on the Judiciary deprives innocent defendants of due process"; 7) the rule encourages perjury by the police; 8) the
"remedy makes hypocrites out of judges"; 9) "[tlhe high cost of applying the exclusionary rule causes the courts to expand the scope of search and seizure for all citizens"; 10)
the rule "is applied with no sense of proportion to the crime of the accused"; 11) the
"remedy is applied with no sense of proportion to the misconduct of the officer"; 12) the
above costs result in "diminished respect for the judicial process among lawyers and
laymen alike." Wilkey, ConstitutionalAlternatives to the Exclusionary Rule, 23 S. TEX.
L.J. 531, 532-33 (1982).
10. Ranney, supra note 2, at 294 ("[t]he first and most obvious disadvantage of the
exclusionary rule is that it frees the guilty"). Wilkey, supra note 9, labels the exclusionary rule the "Great Irrationality" in our system of justice since it excludes evidence but
does not remedy. Id. at 533.
11. For a discussion of the costs of the exclusionary rule see Wilkey, Enforcing the
FourthAmendment by Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule, 95 F.R.D. 211, 220 (1982).
12. See Starkman, supra note 3, at 296; Hall, supra note 3, at 309; Hanscom, supra
note 3, at 799.
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efforts are vitiated1 3) have provided ample grist for the critical
scholar's mill. Perhaps taking a cue from Chief Justice Burger's
opening broadside against the rule in his dissent in Bivens v. Six
Unknown Agents of the FederalBureau of Narcotics 4 (in which he
stated, "If an effective alternative remedy is available, concern for
official observance of the law does not require adherence to the exclusionary rule"'"), scholars regularly propose alternatives to the
rule of exclusion.' 6 Such proposals run the gamut from quasi-judicial commissions, 7 civil remedies 8 and criminal sanctions for violators, 19 to use of the courts' contempt powers.2" In his Bivens
dissent, Chief Justice Burger proposed a "quasi-judicial" remedy
against the government to afford compensation and restitution for
persons whose fourth amendment rights had been violated.2 '
13. Hall, supra note 3.
It is argued that the impact of the rule is not felt personally by the offending
officer; and, therefore, it has no deterrent effect. The law enforcement officer
is primarily interested in apprehending the criminal; and conviction is of secondary concern ....
The average time in California between an arrest and
judicial resolution in regard to legality is approximately 130 days. Therefore,
the officers receive no immediate feedback on the legality of the arrest, and
many times may never learn about the outcome of the hearing [footnotes
omitted].
Id. at 309.
14. Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 411 (1971) (Burger, C. J., dissenting).
15. Id. at 414.
16. See, e.g., Schroeder, DeterringFourth Amendment Violations: Alternatives to the
ExclusionaryRule, 69 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1385-86 (1981). This author suggests that ever-

increasing criticisms of the remedy of exclusion have prompted a reevaluation "of the
traditional alternatives maligned in Mapp." Id. For other examples of alternatives see
Hall, supra note 3, at 311; Wilkey, supra note 2, at 531; Webster, ProtectingSociety's
Rights While PreservingFourthAmendment Protections.An Alternative to the Exclusion-

ary Rule, 23 S. TEx. L.J. 693 (1982); Starkman, supra note 3, at 296; Comment, Contempt of Court As An Alternative To The Exclusionary Rule, 72 J. CRIM. L. &

993 (1981).
17. Gammon, The Exclusionary Rule And The 1983-1984 Term, 68 MARQ. L. REV.
1, 23 (1984). Gammon suggests, inter alia, that Congress could establish "an independent administrative procedure like that applicable to veteran's claims .... " Id. at 22.
18. The federal tort action brought against either the offending officer individually or
the responsible government agency has been called "the only measure which will offer a
remedy to innocent victims of illegal searches .... " Wilkey, supra note 11, at 234.
19. "The first and most logical alternative would be to adopt a system under which
the Executive Branch disciplines its own people." Wilkey, supra note 9, at 537. Wilkey
also suggests a civil tort remedy and a "mini-trial of the alleged offending officer after
the trial of the original accused for his substantive crime." Id. at 538.
20. Comment, supra note 16, at 993.
21. Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. at
422-24.
Congress could enact a statute along the following lines:
CRIMINOLOGY
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Congress has introduced bills to prohibit exclusion if a search
'23
is made in "good faith" 22 or if the invasion is not "substantial,
and to provide for actual and punitive damages to innocent victims
in lieu of exclusion.2 4 The United States Supreme Court has found
"alternatives" in narrowly prescribed circumstances, such as when
the illegal search is made in "good faith,"' 25 when the evidence to be
suppressed rebuts false testimony 26 and when it is to be used in
other than a criminal trial, such as in grand jury27 or civil
proceedings.28
Despite the persuasive theoretical arguments on both sides of
the exclusionary rule debate, there is little empirical evidence sup(a) a waiver of sovereign immunity as to the illegal acts of law enforcement
officials committed in the performance of assigned duties;
(b) the creation of a cause of action for damages sustained by any person aggrieved by conduct of governmental agents in violation of the Fourth Amendment or statutes regulating offical conduct;
(c) the creation of a tribunal, quasi-judicial in nature or perhaps patterned
after the United States Court of Claims, to adjudicate all claims under the
statute;
(d) a provision that this statutory remedy is in lieu of the exclusion of evidence
secured for use in criminal cases in violation of the Fourth Amendment; and
(e) a provision directing that no evidence, otherwise admissible, shall be excluded from any criminal proceeding because of violation of the Fourth
Amendment. Id.
22. Eg., S. 1995, 97th Cong. 1st Sess. (1981); S. 2231, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1982).
See Rader, Legislating A Remedy For The Fourth Amendment, 23 S. TEX. L.J. 585
(1982) for a discussion of these and other related bills.
23. See S. 101, 97th Cong., 1st and 2nd Sess. (1981). This bill would have added a
section to Title 18 of the United States Code prohibiting the exclusion of evidence
merely because the evidence was obtained in violation of the fourth amendment unless it
is found, as a matter of law, that there is an intentional or substantial violation of the
Constitution. This bill was not passed.
24. S. 751, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), would have amended Title 28 of the United
States Code to provide that actual and punitive damages could be awarded based on a
complete consideration "of the case including the extent to which: 1) the officer's conduct deviated from permissible standards, 2) the violation was willful, reckless or
grossly negligent, 3) the aggrieved party's privacy was invaded, 4) the aggrieved party
was injured physically or mentally, 5) property was damaged," and 6) a tort award
might act as a deterrent against future fourth amendment violations. Rader, supra note
22, at 612. This bill was not passed.
25. See, e.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976); Michigan v. DeFillippo,
443 U.S. 31 (1979); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984).
26. In United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980) the Court, per Justice White,
allowed impeachment during cross-examination of a defendant based on illegally-seized
evidence, which was otherwise inadmissible to the government's direct case, in response
to the defendant's direct examination.
27. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974). The majority stated that
applying the exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings would damage those proceedings, outweighing the "benefit of any possible incremental deterrent effect." Id.
28. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
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porting either view.29 This article asserts that the problem for all of
these proposed alternatives is that they fail to reconcile the two
dominant rationales for the exclusionary rule: deterrence and judicial integrity. Although the two rationales are not mutually exclusive, adherence to only one or the other can lead to irrational
results.3 ° Furthermore, it is unlikely that a consensus on exclusionary rule reform will ever be possible without such a reconciliation.
This inherent conflict was first revealed in United States v. Calandra.3 1 In that case, the Court acknowledged that despite widespread belief to the contrary, the holding in Mapp v. Ohio3 2 ("the
exclusionary rule is an essential part of both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments" 3 3 ) was only a plurality opinion. A majority of
the Mapp Court either ruled on other grounds or agreed with Justice Black in concurrence, who simply stated he was "not persuaded that the Fourth Amendment, standing alone, would be
enough to [require exclusion]." 34 The Court in Calandrastated the
exclusionary rule "is a judicially created remedy designated to safe29. An illustration of frustration can be seen by comparing comments by Blumberg,
supra note 7, at 46, who argues against the existence of a deterrent effect through enforcement of the exclusionary rule, to comments in Joseph, The Case For The Exclusionary Rule, 14 HUM. RTS. 38 (1987); Joseph attacks Blumberg for lack of empirical
evidence to support a non-deterrent effect and states that "only anecdotal evidence will
ever be available on the issue of deterrence" since it is difficult to design a scientific
study to measure "action not taken and things not done." Id. at 43. A study which
directly examines empirical research conducted in regard to effects of the exclusionary
rule is Canon, Ideology and Reality In The Debate Over The Exclusionary Rule: A Conservative Argument For Its Retention, 23 S. TEX. L.J. 559 (1982). Canon supports the
theory that it is practically impossible to determine the deterrent impact with any certainty and that the studies conducted are both few and inconclusive.
30. An example of application of the rule focusing on one dominant rationale and
resulting in a conclusion which might have been different had the alternative rationale
been considered is seen in United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974). The majority
took into account only the deterrence function in concluding that a grand jury witness
may not refuse to answer questions on the ground that they are based on illegally-seized
evidence. Id. at 351-52. The dissenters, however, reached a different conclusion by
focusing on the other rationales for application of the exclusionary rule such as judicial
integrity and assurance that the government does not profit from its lawless behavior.
Id. at 360-61. In regard to consideration of deterrence as a rationale, the dissenters
claimed such a result may only be hoped for in application of the rule. Id. at 355-56.
31. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
32. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
33. Id. at 657.
34. Id. at 661. The majority opinion was delivered by Justice Clark. There were
two separate concurring opinions by Justices Black and Douglas. The three dissenters
were represented by Justice Harlan's opinion. Justice Stewart provided a memorandum
in which he agreed with part one of Harlan's dissent but had no view as to the merits of
the constitutional issue.
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guard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutionalright [emphasis added] of
the party aggrieved." 3 5 The dissenting justices in Calandra,who
cited the plurality language in Mapp and insisted the majority "seriously errs in describing the exclusionary rule as merely 'a judicially
created remedy

. .

." were simply out-voted.36

By the time the Supreme Court decided United States v.
Leon,3 7 a Court majority could say with confidence that the language in some opinions of "individual Justices [which] has sometimes implied that the exclusionary rule is a necessary corollary of
the Fourth Amendment ... need not detain us long." 3 Leon con-

firmed the Calandra holding by describing the exclusionary rule as
no more than "a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard
Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect
Although the dissenting justices in Leon unsuccessfully
attempted to resurrect the "part and parcel" language of the plurality opinion in Mapp, they did acknowledge that the majority based
the exclusionary rule solely on the deterrence rationale.4"
Thus, Calandraand Leon signaled the death knell for "judicial
integrity" as a primary rationale for the exclusionary rulealthough concededly it had already been virtually destroyed by
Supreme Court decisions allowing illegally-obtained evidence to be
used to impeach witnesses at trial, 4 1 in grand jury proceedings, 42

and when obtained from someone other than the defendant.4 3 It is
35. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348. This language has led many supporters of the exclusionary rule to believe that the Court purposely created an alternative
route which may eventually lead to the demise of the rule.
36. Id. at 360 (quoting the majority opinion at 348). The majority controlled by a 63 vote.
37. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). Police officers provided a magistrate
with affidavits and summaries of surveillance activities in order to obtain a search warrant. The warrant was issued, resulting in the seizure of a large quantity of drugs. The
district court later determined that the affidavit was insufficient to establish probable
cause and refused to recognize a good-faith exception to the application of the exclusionary rule. The Court reiterated that deterring unlawful police conduct was the purpose of the exclusionary rule and it was not designed to punish magistrates and judges
who erred.
38. Id. at 905-06.
39. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348.
40. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. at 940.
41. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620-(1980).
42. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
43. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). The Court reaffirmed an earlier ruling which prohibited courts from excluding evidence under the fourth amendment unless the unlawful search or seizure violated the defendant's own constitutional rights.
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clear the way is now open for a viable alternative to the exclusionary rule.
What is not so clear, however, is whether an alternative based
purely on deterrence will pass muster, despite the apparent existing
majority on the Court who feel deterrence is the "sole" rationale for
exclusion. The majority is too thin and the exclusionary rule too
ingrained in American jurisprudence to fall before any such narrowly-prescribed alternative. 4 Nevertheless, any alternative must,
at a minimum, have a deterrent effect at least equivalent to
exclusion.
This article explores the alternatives to exclusion: Part II reviews the judicial and scholarly criticisms of the exclusionary rule;
Part III reviews alternatives proposed by legal scholars. Finally,
Part IV sets forth an alternative which provides equivalent deterrence and at the same time adheres to basic precepts of judicial integrity. The author therefore submits this proposal as an "effective
alternative remedy" as called for by the former Chief Justice of the
United States.4 5
II. CRITICISM OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
A 1979 Government Accounting Office study has revealed that
83.3% of all motions filed in criminal cases are related to exclusion
of evidence based on alleged fourth or fifth amendment violations.4 6
At a time when the courts are overburdened, 47 and prosecutors are
The defendant's fourth amendment rights are violated only in situations where the defendant has a reasonable expectation of privacy which is violated.
44. Perhaps the exclusionary rule has avoided complete elimination because, as set
forth by Joseph, supra note 29, at 43: "It is a particular expression of the basic principle
that nobody should profit by his/her own wrongdoing, and it gives recognition to the
basic fact of human nature that it is easier to do right if there is no profit in doing
wrong." Id.
45. Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. at
414.
46. Wilkey, supra note 9. "In the [Government Accounting Office] study 60.1% of
all motions filed involved the fourth amendment. The next most numerous type motion, confessions, amounted to only 23.2%." Id. at 535. There is no other single legal
issue which can compare to the burden on criminal courts created by search and seizure

issues.
47. Id. at 535. Search and seizure problems take up quite a bit of trial court time
and, as Judge Malcolm Wilkey points out, it is not only the trial courts which are
burdened with this issue. He states: "Frequently the only appellate issue is the validity
of the search." Not only is it the most frequently-litigated issue, but it also generates
the most labor. Id. Similarly, Hall points out that a practical problem with the exclusionary rule is the additional workload it creates. Defense attorneys routinely file motions to suppress evidence, often only to avoid malpractice suits based on claims of
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reduced to heavy reliance on plea bargaining to obtain convictions, 48 the question arises whether justice is served when the limited resources of the courts are in large measure devoted to such
secondary matters rather than to such primary considerations as the
guilt or innocence of the accused. 49 This strain on judicial and
prosecutorial resources has resulted in a system in which very few
defendants can be provided with their "day in court," and are instead fed into the assembly line of plea bargaining." ° It is an ironic
but practical consequence of many court decisions guaranteeing additional defendant rights, that these same courts are thereby left
without the resources to provide the defendant's "day in court"
which is a fundamental prerequisite for fairness.
Despite the stated concern for judicial integrity expressed by
some individual Supreme Court justices,51 there is evidence that the
exclusionary rule itself has brought the judicial system into disrepute.52 Certainly the vision, real or not, of a confessed murderer
going free and laughing in the faces of the relatives of his victim is
enough to cause utter contempt for a system of justice that allows
such behavior. That such dismissals caused by the exclusion of evidence are relatively rare5 3 does little to diminish the impact of even
incompetence of counsel. Hall, supra note 3, at 310. Blumberg furthers this proposition
by noting that "shrewd attorneys will exploit whatever pretexts they can find to raise
such [fourth amendment] issues, regardless of the merits, because it is so advantageous
for plea-bargaining purposes." Blumberg, supra note 7, at 46.
48. Former Chief Justice Burger notes that the criminal justice system relies on the
fact that "approximately 90 percent of all defendants will plead guilty ....
Even a
small reduction of this percentage (for example, from 90% to 80%) would require twice
the judicial manpower and facilities to match the existing 10% which are now tried.
N.Y. Times, Aug. 11, 1970, at 24, col. 5.
49. As previously noted, one of the twelve recognized costs of the exclusionary rule
is that the misplaced burden on the judiciary deprives innocent defendants of due process. Wilkey, supra note 9. Ranney addresses this problem by pointing out that since
Mapp there has been a "tremendous shift in emphasis in criminal litigation from.., the
central questions of guilt or innocence and proper sentencing to 'game playing' associated with fourth amendment litigation." Ranney, supra note 2, at 299. Webster states,
"By excluding reliable evidence from a prosecutor's case, the court's main function in
determining guilt or innocence is undermined and often precluded." Webster, supra
note 16, at 703.
50. For a summary of a study published in the 1983 annual report of the (California)
Judicial Council on the increasing number of guilty pleas, see More Guilty Pleas, More
Appeals, 3 CAL. LAW., Nov., 1983, at 20.
51. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 355 (dissenting opinion of Justice
Brennan joined by Justices Douglas and Marshall); see also United States v. Leon, 468
U.S. at 928 (dissenting opinions of Justice Brennan joined by Justice Marshall and Justice Stevens, dissenting in part. Id. at 960).
52. Supra note 3.
53. Canon states that while empirical research into the question of the release of
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the rare case. The reality is: "The criminal goes free, if he must, but
it is the law that sets him free." 54
One may also wonder about the judicial integrity of a system
which permits prosecutors to make "deals" with known felons, then
turn them loose on an unsuspecting public in return for testimonial
favors,5 5 or which condones the coercion of confessions (i.e., guilty
pleas) by threatening serious bodily harm (i.e., pursuing a death
penalty) if the defendant does not comply. 56 The fact that the latter
is euphemistically called "plea bargaining" (concessions for confescriminals due to successful fourth amendment motions "is not extensive enough to allow absolute conclusions," existing evidence suggests the conclusion that the rule "has
had only a very small impact in keeping seemingly guilty persons out of jail." Canon,
supra note 29, at 575.
Blumberg notes that even the small number of "seemingly guilty" persons who go
free affects the reputation of our judicial system. That the "guilty go free because the
constable has blundered" is perhaps the most persuasive argument for abolition of the
exclusionary rule. This may be partially due to the media exploitation of criminals who
are freed as a result of exclusion. The resulting harm is public frustration with our
criminal justice system which must be considered in "any thorough assessment of the
exclusionary rule." Blumberg, supra note 7, at 47. This argument is strengthened by a
fact raised by Judge Wilkey: "One of the two largest categories of evidentiary items
suppressed is illegal weapons." The exclusion of this evidence "permits the existence of
the iron lock of criminal dominance over vast numbers of our citizens." Wilkey, supra
note 9, at 536.
54. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. at 659.
55. The United States Supreme Court has upheld plea bargaining as both necessary
and proper. See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977) (the guilty plea and the
plea bargain are important components of the criminal justice system); Santobello v.
New York, 404 U.S. 257, 280 (1971) (plea bargaining is an essential component of the
administration of justice). The American Bar Association has also approved of plea
bargaining in STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY § 1.8(a)(i) (Approved
Draft, 1968). In regard to testimonial favors it states: "Concessions which in the absence of cooperation would be inappropriate should be granted only when the offender's
cooperation has resulted or may result in the successful prosecution of one or more
other offenders engaged in equally serious or more serious criminal conduct." Id. at
§ 1.8(a)(v). See also ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 350.3,
(Commentary 1975).
56. The United States Supreme Court addressed this issue in two cases. In United
States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968) the defendant challenged the Federal Kidnapping
Act (18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)) on the ground that it was highly coercive because a defendant
who plea bargains is virtually assured of avoiding the death penalty. A defendant who
relies on a jury acquittal runs the risk of the jury recommending the death penalty. The
Court found that the purpose of the statute (to limit the death penalty to cases in which
a jury recommends it) may be achieved through alternative means. The Court also
found the statute unconstitutional to the extent that it penalized the assertion of a defendant's fifth and sixth amendment rights. However, the defendant in Brady v. United
States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970) pursued an unsuccessful appeal even though he entered his
guilty plea under the Federal Kidnapping Act prior to the Jackson decision. The court
reiterated that a plea of guilty is valid if it is both voluntary and intelligent. A guilty
plea is not rendered involuntary simply because it was an attempt to avoid the possibil-
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sions) does little to improve the public's impression of the judicial
integrity of the system." And how is judicial integrity served by
excluding evidence for some purposes, but not others, such as impeaching a defendant at trial,58 or use in grand jury59 or civil
proceedings?6"
It has even been suggested that exclusion, far from protecting
judicial integrity, has actually denigrated it by, as one scholar has
put it, opening up "a whole new field of police misconduct: perjury."'" Other critics have suggested the arbitrariness of the exclusionary rule has induced judges to engage in "stretching the law
here, and twisting it there"6 2 in order to avoid what may be an unjust result, all to the further detriment of judicial integrity.
There is evidence that reliance on the exclusionary remedy has
inhibited development of other remedies which might truly deter
police misconduct. One survey has revealed that, contrary to popular belief, police officers support the exclusionary rule, particularly
when the alternatives presented are demotion or suspension of the
offending officer, fines or other sanctions.6 3
Proponents of the exclusionary rule reject the criticism that exclusion is not an effective deterrent against police misconduct ostensibly because deterrence is directed toward the entire entity of
ity of the death penalty, nor is it an unintelligent plea just because later judicial decisions indicate the plea is based on a faulty premise.
57. Smith, The Plea BargainingControversy, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 949
(1986). Smith notes that "pleas are a continuing source of controversy. Some critics
argue that a system of negotiated justice undermines the deterrent effectiveness of punishment and can be used by influential defendants to evade legal sanctions." Consistent
with this argument is the premise that seasoned defendants who have "more firsthand
experience with the justice system, are able to negotiate more favorable sentences." Id.
citing to D. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL (1966); J.Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME (1975).
58. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980).
59. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
60. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
61. Rosenblatt, A Legal House of Cards, HARPER'S, Jul., 1977, at 18; Wilkey, supra
note 9, at 532 includes police perjury as one of the twelve costs to the American people
and our justice system. For a discussion of the application of the fourth amendment
and possible consequences of police perjury see Grano, A Dilemma for Defense Counsel
Spinelli-HarrisSearch Warrants and the Possibility of Police Perjury, U. ILL. L. F. 405,
408-11 (1971); Sevilla, The Exclusionary Rule and Police Perjury, 11 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 839 (1974).
62. Ranney, supra note 2, at 298.
63. Blumberg, supra note 7, at 48. "Contrary to popular belief, police officers support the rule that excludes improperly gathered evidence from courts, according to a
University of Florida study." Id.
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government, not just police officers. 64 This argument misses the
point. The only people who must suffer the consequence of exclusion are the innocent victims of the released criminal. To the police
officer, prosecutor, judge or other government bureaucrat, it may be
just another case in thousands that may come their way. Many officers are not even aware of the manner of disposition of many of
their cases. It is no wonder that police officers favor exclusion over
sanctions.65 Indeed, a police officer rarely has anything personally
to fear from application of the exclusionary rule.6 6 He or she suffers little more from exclusion than the average citizen.
An examination of the possibility of recovery for a victim of a
fourth amendment violation under either federal law authorizing
prosecution, or the Federal Tort Claims Act authorizing tort recovery, reveals such forms of recompense are rare.6 7 This illogical no64. This basic desire to preserve the sanctity of an entire government began even
before the exclusionary rule emerged:
[N]o man in this country is so high that he is above the law. No officer of the
law may set that law at defiance with impunity. All the officers of the government, from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law, and are bound
to obey it.
United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882). More recently, Joseph points out that
the battle is over "effective restraints on government [emphasis added] which were established in the Bill of Rights." Joseph, supra note 29, at 44. Similarly, the author of
Comment, The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: United States v. Leon
and Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 27 B.C.L. REV. 609 (1986) states, "The proper view of
the rule is that it restrains a monolithic prosecution network," which includes not only
the police, but the judiciary and the rest of government as well. Id. at 615.
65. Blumberg, supra note 7, at 48.
66. Webster, supra note 16, states "the exclusionary rule provides no direct sanctions against the police. The sanction under the exclusionary rule is applied to the
prosecutor, not to the police," over whom the prosecution has no control. Id. at 702.
Webster quotes then Chief Justice Burger: "[I]f prisons do not deter forbidden conduct,
how can we think that a policeman will be deterred by a judicial ruling ...which never
affects him personally?" Id. at 702, citing to Bivens v. Six Agents of the Federal Bureau
of Narcotics, 403 U.S. at 417. The emergence of prospective police unions and the
relationship of officers and superior officers as well as police departments and prosecutor's offices tend "to exacerbate the disciplinary situation." Starkman, supra note 3, at
301. A remedy to this problem is examined in the Comment, supra note 16. Athough
there is no conclusive data to "support the deterrence value of either suppression or
contempt sanctions, improvement in deterrence should result from the direct punishment of police officers." Id. at 1018-19.
67. 18 U.S.C. § 2236 (1983), "was enacted in 1921 making it a misdemeanor for a
federal officer to participate in illegal search and seizure," but according to Hall, supra
note 3, "there [had] been no prosecutions under this statute" as of 1980. Id. at 312.
Similarly, 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1983), which provides for criminal sanctions for those who
violate the civil rights of others, is rarely enforced against law enforcement officers.
Hall, supra note 3, at 312.
The Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2671-80 (1983) (available against state
police officers) provides for victims of illegal searches and seizures "a claim against the
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tion of punishing Peter to deter Paul is illustrated best by a scenario
authored by John Wigmore:
Titus, you have been found guilty of conducting a lottery;
Flavius, you have confessedly violated the Constitution. Titus
ought to suffer imprisonment for crime, and Flavius for contempt. But no! We shall let you both go free. We shall not punish Flavius directly, but shall do so by reversing Titus'
conviction. This is our way of teaching people like Flavius to
behave, and of teaching people like Titus to behave, and incidentally of securing respect for the Constitution. Our way of upholding the Constitution is not to strike at the man who breaks
it, but to let off somebody else who broke something else.68
A final criticism of exclusion is that it is applied in an arbitrary
manner without considering the degree of the unlawful intrusion or
the magnitude of the underlying crime. 69 A police officer who forgets to perfunctorily recite one of the Miranda advisements7" in a
murder case may receive the same sanction as a rampaging agent
who, without a warrant or probable cause, wrecks a house looking
for evidence of a misdemeanor-namely, exclusion of any evidence
obtained. If no useful evidence is obtained, no sanction is imposed.7 1 For a system which prides itself on imposing punishment
fitting the crime, arbitrary exclusion stands out as a true aberration.
Critics of the exclusionary rule are often attacked for seeking
government for the misconduct of erring police officers." But compensation is only
available for the defendant who actually possessed incriminating evidence and was successful in having it suppressed. If no evidence was obtained, "no matter how outrageous the violation, the victim ...has no remedy... against the government." Wilkey,
supra note 9, at 538. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1983) provides remedies for civil rights violations committed by "[e]very person who [acts] under ...any statute, ordinance, regulation ... of any state .... "
68. J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2184a, at 31 n.1 (1961).
69. As noted previously, two of the twelve costs of imposing the exclusionary rule
are that it is applied with no sense of proportion to the misconduct of the officer or to
the crime of the accused. Wilkey, supra note 9, at 533. In his famous dissent in Bivens,
Former Chief Justice Burger analogizes the situation to a police order authorizing an
officer to "shoot to kill" every fugitive. The former Chief Justice explains that the public has a right to expect "rationally graded responses from judges in place of the universal 'capital punishment' we inflict on all evidence when police error is shown in its
acquisition." Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. at 419.
70. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
71. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949), where Justice Jackson, dissenting, states: "Courts can protect the innocent against such [unlawful] invasions only
indirectly and through the medium of excluding evidence obtained against those who
frequently are guilty." Id. at 181. This point by Justice Jackson follows the logic so
aptly ridiculed in Wigmore's scenario about Titus and Flavius, supra note 68.
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to "erode a commitment to civil liberties."' 72 Such criticism is valid,
however, only if one accepts the assumption that exclusion truly
deters, and that no alternative remedy for enforcement is available.
It is true the remedies available at the time the exclusionary rule
was promulgated were generally ineffective in enforcing the fourth
and fifth amendments.7 3 Police departments did not employ the
means available to them to enforce constitutional discipline. Police
officers who found evidence of a serious crime were heroes, even if
they did not follow every "technical" requirement. Prosecutors
who had to cooperate with the police on a daily basis were reluctant
to seek sanctions against police officers who inadvertently failed to
follow a required procedure, but who nevertheless obtained evidence against a drug-pusher who was terrorizing the local
community.74
Private lawsuits against a police officer for a fourth or fifth
amendment violation were also ineffective as a means of enforcement.75 Impecunious prisoners could hardly be expected to find a
lawyer who would sue a police officer who forgot to give a required
warning before questioning the prisoner,76 particularly if as a result
of the questioning the prisoner reveals where the body of a murdered child is buried. One can imagine how a jury would react to a
lawyer's demand that the jury award damages to the prisoner con72. Joseph, supra note 29, at 38. See also United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (Brennan, J. dissenting): "The majority ignores the fundamental constitutional importance of
what is at stake here .... [W]e may be lured by the temptations of expediency into
forsaking our commitment to protecting individual liberty and privacy." Id. at 929-30.
Canon argues for the retention of the exclusionary rule solely on a symbolic basis,
namely "that the rule should be preserved because of its symbolic reassurance to the
public that the government is committed to the basic values of privacy, the rule of law
and fairness." Canon, supra note 29, at 560.
73. The tendency [emphasis added] of those who execute the criminal laws of the
country to obtain conviction by means of unlawful seizures and enforced confessions, the latter often obtained after subjecting accused persons to unwarranted practices destructive of rights secured by the federal constitution,
should find no sanction in the judgments of the courts ....
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. at 392.
74. Supra note 66.
75. Supra note 67.
76. Part of the difficulty is that often these "victims" are guilty of crimes, and therefore "lack the minimum elements of respectability which must be present to form a base
upon which the fiction of reparation can operate." As a result, these individuals face
the impossible hurdle of proving damages. When successful, actual pecuniary damages
are likely to be small. Hall, supra note 3, at 315 citing to Foote, Tort Remedies for
Police Violation of Individual Rights, 39 MINN. L. REV. 493, 500 (1955).
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victed of the murder. What would the damages be?77 What is the
going price for a technical violation of the fifth amendment if there
is no actual damage other than an otherwise just conviction for a
horrifying crime?
The plurality opinion in Mapp has a point: the fourth amendment is meaningless without an effective means of enforcement. 78
The only other means of enforcement available at the time of Mapp
(internal police disciplinary action, criminal prosecution and civil
suits) were neither practical nor viable. 79 Are we then left with a
choice between the exclusionary rule, with all its anomolies and irrationalities, or no effective enforcement at all?
The quest for Chief Justice Burger's "effective alternative" continues. But while dozens of alternatives have been proposed, none
provide effective enforcement while eliminating exclusionary rule
anomolies.
III.

PROPOSED ALTERNATIVES TO THE
EXCLUSIONARY RULE

Only alternatives to the exclusionary rule which had not been
proposed at the time of Mapp v. Ohio are here considered. The
Mapp Court found internal police discipline, criminal prosecution
and civil redress to be ineffective,"0 despite considerable scholarly
support for one or more of these proposals.81 Because nothing has
77. Webster suggests compensation for actual damages, reasonable attorneys fees
and damages for mental pain, anguish, distress etc. Webster, supra note 16, at 714.
78. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. at 655. "Were it otherwise, then just as without the
Weeks rule the assurance against unreasonable federal searches and seizures would be 'a
form of words,' valueless and undeserving of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties .
Id.
79. Supra note 67.
80. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. at 652. The Supreme Court stated alternative remedies
for fourth amendment violations were "worthless and futile". Id.
81. For an example of internal police discipline see, Wilkey, The Exclusionary Rule:
Why Suppress Valid Evidence?, 62 JUDICATURE 214, 230-32 (1978). Imposing criminal
sanctions on the offending officer is discussed by Wigmore, Using Evidence Obtainedby
Illegal Search and Seizure, 8 A.B.A. J. 479, 479-80 (citing to Williams v. State, 100 Ga.
511, 28 S.E. 624 (1897)) and at 484 (1922). Civil redress is discussed by Webster, Protecting Society's Rights While Preserving Fourth Amendment Protection: An Alternative
to the Exclusionary Rule, 23 S. TEX. L.J. 693, 713-16 (1982). Hall suggests that criminal sanctions against the offending officer do not work because officers, judges and prosecutors are reluctant to impose penalties on their fellow workers within the criminal
justice system. If implemented, criminal sanctions might "create a whole new set of
overwhelming problems," among them: reduced effectiveness of police; a negative public image of police; and a judiciary reluctant to rule evidence illegally seized if it would
result in confinement of the officer. Hall, supra note 3, at 312-13.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE JOURNAL

[Vol. 11:357

changed since Mapp to suggest these proposals are any more viable
today than at that time,82 it is unlikely the Supreme Court will discard the exclusionary rule based on a reconsideration of the effec8 3
tiveness of the proposals.
The use of a court's contempt powers to punish violators of
citizens' rights was first proposed by John Wigmore in his evidence
treatise:
The natural way to do justice here would be to enforce the

splendid and healthy principle of the Fourth Amendment directly, i.e., by sending for the high handed, over-zealous marshall
who had searched without a warrant, imposing a thirty-day imprisonment for his contempt of the Constitution, and then proceeding to affirm the sentence of the convicted criminal.84

Unfortunately, Wigmore's proposal has the same disadvantages which led the Mapp Court to reject internal police discipline
and criminal prosecution as substitutes for exclusion. 5 A judge is
subject to the same practical and political pressures that inhibit internal discipline and criminal prosecution.8 6 It is one matter for a
judge to exclude evidence because the law requires it; it is quite another to incarcerate a well-meaning police officer who forgot to recite a Miranda warning. Wigmore's example suggests that use of
contempt powers would be viable only in cases of extreme violations. It is therefore an inadequate substitute for exclusion, which
at least purports to deter even minor infractions.87
82. Hall surmises that the "Mapp approach," regardless of an attempt to incorporate
alternatives, should be discarded; other alternatives, independent of Mapp, should be
considered to protect fourth amendment rights without imperiling other worthwhile
goals. Hall, supra note 3, at 318-21.
83. As previously noted, certain members of the Burger Court did attempt to bring
the exclusionary rule to an end, but were unsuccessful. Supra note 5.
84. Wigmore, supra note 81, at 484.
85. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. at 652.
86. "Knowing the consequences of finding a constitutional violation, judges may fail
to find one where overall justice seems to require a conviction. As a result, search and
seizure law becomes distorted by including other factors such as a judge's idea of overall
justice." Webster, supra note 85, at 705. This theory is supported by Justice Powell in
his concurring opinion in Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 430 (1981) where he
states: "[m]ore may stem from the often unpalatable consequences of the exclusionary
rule, which spur the court to reduce its analysis to simple mechanical rules so that the
constable has a fighting chance not to blunder." Id. Consequently, it has been suggested
the judiciary may be less inclined to decide evidence was illegally seized if the results
will be incarceration of the police officer. Hall, supra note 3, at 312-13.
87. See Comment, supra note 16, for a discussion of the "strain on judicial resources
and the 'questionable deterrent value' of civil contempt sanctions." The author concludes "civil contempt sanctions would not be a practical remedy for police violations."
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Chief Justice Burger's proposal for a "civilian review board" 8
suffers from the same deficiency. While it might appear that an independent civilian review board established for the express purpose
of disciplining violators of citizens' rights would be immune from
the inhibiting factors affecting police, prosecutors and judges, 9
such a review board could hardly be expected to "throw the book"
at technical violators. The inherent conflict between an humane institution's desire to promote justice by tempering it with mercy, and
the ironclad guarantees of the Bill of Rights, effectively diminishes
the viability of all proposed alternatives to the exclusionary rule
under which sanctions are considered independently from the underlying criminal case.
Another proposed alternative suffers because it addresses only
one of the undesirable consequences of exclusion. The American
Law Institute's (ALI) "balancing" test9 ° doubtless takes its cue
from language in Supreme Court opinions suggesting the benefits of
exclusion should be "weighed" against its harms. 9 Under this approach, exclusion would only be applied if the violation was "substantial."9 2 Factors to be considered would include the degree and
extent to which the violation was willful, the harm incurred, the
deterrent effect of exclusion and the inevitability of discovery of the
In regard to criminal contempt, he points out "it demands some showing of willfulness
and proof beyond a reasonable doubt .... " As a result of these requirements, "criminal
sanctions would be difficult to secure for many police violations." Id. at 1013.
88. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
at 422, then Chief Justice Burger suggests the exclusionary rule be replaced by a statute
which would permit victims of fourth amendment violations to go before a special tribunal and collect damages from the government.
89. Supra, notes 66 and 86.
90. ALI MODEL CODE OF PREARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 290.2 (1975) (substantiality test).
91. Stone v. United States, 428 U. S. 465, 487 (1976). The Court held a federal court
could not grant habeas corpus relief to a state prisoner after illegally-obtained evidence
was admitted at trial unless the state had not afforded the prisoner a fair opportunity to
litigate his fourth amendment claim. The holding was based on the reasoning set forth
in United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974): "Our refusal to extend the exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings was based on a balancing of the potential injury to
the historic role and function of the grand jury by such extension against the potential
contribution to the effectuation of the fourth amendment through deterrence of police
misconduct .... " Stone v. United States, 428 U.S. at 487. In Stone, this analysis led to
the conclusion that applying the exclusionary rule to the "consideration of search and
seizure claims of state prisoners on collateral review" would result in minimal benefit in
relation to societal costs. Id. at 493. For criticism of this cost-benefit analysis, see supra
note 5.
92. A substantial violation is one which was willful, gross, or prejudicial to the accused. ALI MODEL CODE OF PREARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE, supra note 90.
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seized evidence.9 3 A supporter of this alternative has suggested
such additional factors as the magnitude of the underlying crime
and the reliability of the evidence seized.9"
Supporters of the exclusionary rule oppose such an alternative
because it still would permit admission of certain types of illegallyobtained evidence.9 5 For example, it would be unlikely that a failure to give one of the Miranda rights would be deemed "substantial" when compared to an illegal house search. In addition, it
would reduce even further what deterrence is achieved through exclusion, as police officers could justify illegal searches in advance as
being "unsubstantial." 96 Moveover, any violation falling short of
"substantial" would trigger no sanctions whatsoever, despite
the infringement of a citizen's rights.
A more imaginative approach has been proposed by Judge
Malcolm Wilkey who suggests a "mini-trial" of an alleged rights
violation could be held after the trial of the defendant.97 Under this
approach the evidence in the original case would be admitted conditionally, subject to proportional disciplinary measures being taken
against the officer. If the officer was not disciplined, the conviction
of the original defendant would be overturned.9 8 Unfortunately,
even this novel approach fails to address the primary concerns of
exclusionary rule supporters.9 9 Aside from the obvious administra-

tive problems, there are other more practical concerns that would
arise from such a "quasi-final" criminal judgment. Would the original defendant be entitled to release or to bail pending the outcome
of the administrative action? Would the original defendant be entitled to be heard at the administrative action? How would a less
93. Id.
94. Hall, supra note 3, at 313.
95. The court is in a position to "balance" deterrent value in particular cases against
crime-control values and create exceptions to the rule. Joseph, supra note 29, at 42.
96. Joseph, supra note 29, at 42. "Eventually, the rule will be so narrowed that it
will apply in so few cases that even its deterrent value will be open to serious question
... Id. Hall suggests the ALI balancing test, standing alone, will fail to provide
sanctions which would deter unconstitutional law-enforcement activity. Hall, supra
note 3, at 314.
97. Wilkey, supra note 9, at 538.
98. Id. at 538-39.
99. Canon, supra note 29, at 580, who argues for retention of the exclusionary rule
for symbolic purposes, addresses the "mini-trial" issue by noting that such an alternative suggests "you have these fourth amendment rights, but you can be dispossessed of
them for a modest amount of money." Id. See also Hall, supra note 3, at 315, who
addresses the problem of creating fair adversarial treatment for a criminal who is a
victim of a fourth amendment violation.
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than flagrant, but nevertheless clear, violation of rights be dealt
with? Would an officer who forgets to give the third Miranda warning have to be sent to prison as a prerequisite for a conviction of the
original accused? Would the original conviction remain in limbo,
even if administrative action was unduly delayed, perhaps for years?
In short, implementation of the "mini-trial" alternative would be
problematic, if not unworkable.
Finally, there is the "good-faith" exception to the exclusionary
rule which was adopted, at least in part, by the Supreme Court in
United States v. Leon."° In that case the Court cited United States
v. Peltier,'° ' which states: "[W]here the official action was pursued
in complete good faith, however, the deterrence rationale loses
much of its force."' 1 2 Thus, the Court declined to apply the exclusionary rule when a warrant, unsupported by probable cause, was
relied upon in good faith by police officers who obtained evidence
pursuant to the warrant. 103
This "good-faith" exception to the rule has been severely criticized.° 4 First, the exception is based on the hotly-debated assumption that the exclusionary rule was designed to deter only police
officers, and not those magistrates or judges who might sometimes
rubber-stamp warrant applications.10 5 Second, it creates an incentive for an officer to be ignorant of the law. Although the Court
noted the officer's reliance on a defective warrant must be "objec100. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. at 922.
101. United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975). The court announced that if
deterrence were the justification for excluding evidence, then the purpose of the rule
would only be served in situations where law enforcement officials knew or should have
known that the search was unconstitutional.
102. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. at 919 quoting United States v. Peltier, 422
U.S. at 539.
103. Id. at 922. "We conclude that the marginal or nonexistent benefits produced by
suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant cannot justify the substantial costs of exclusion." Id.
104. In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. at 956, Justice Brennan (dissenting) expressed concern that the majority decision conveys "a message to magistrates that their
decisions to issue warrants are now insulated from subsequent judicial review." Id.
Consequently, magistrates "need not take much care in reviewing warrant applications,
since their mistakes will ... have no consequence." Id.
105. Id. at 916-17. The Supreme Court, in approving the good faith exception noted
first the exclusionary rule was not designed to punish judges who erred, but rather to
deter unlawful police misconduct. Second, they noted there was no evidence to suggest
"that judges and magistrates are inclined to ignore . . . the Fourth Amendment,"
thereby requiring the harsh sanction of exclusion. Lastly, the Court expressed disbelief
that excluding evidence obtained pursuant to a defective warrant would have a deterrent effect on the judge. Id.
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tively reasonable," it is unrealistic to believe any police officer
would try to second-guess a magistrate's opinion, particularly when
the Supreme Court Justices split 5-4 on such issues. In any case,
the rule does not give an officer an incentive to take classes in con06
stitutional law. 1
The most destructive characteristic of the "good-faith" exception is the damage done to the integrity of the exclusionary rule by
its use. Some scholars are convinced this questionable exception
will eventually swallow the rule.'1 7 As applied, the exception increases skepticism about the rule and further diminishes respect for
the law. A more reasoned application of "good faith" would be that
a truly good-faith search is a "reasonable" search within the clear
language of the fourth amendment. There would then be no reason
to further carve out an exception to the exclusionary rule-there
would simply be no violation, and therefore no need for a sanction.
The Court in Leon, however, made it clear that "[w]hether the exclusionary sanction is appropriately imposed in a particular case...
is 'an issue separate from the question whether the Fourth Amendment rights of the party seeking to invoke the rule were violated by
police conduct'

. . .

. Only the former question is currently before us

"9108

Thus, while the "good-faith" exception threatens to erode the
exclusionary rule, there is no viable alternative to take its place.
Carried to its logical conclusion, the courts would be left with those
very sanctions (civil suit, internal discipline and criminal prosecution) which, because of their inadequacy, gave rise to the exclusionary rule in the first place. Consequently, if a police officer ransacks
an innocent person's home in "good faith," the evidence may be
106. On the contrary, the exclusionary rule does not require, nor do policeman have
the time or training to read and understand appellate opinions which define the standards of conduct which they are to follow. Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Fed-

eral Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. at 417. But see Joseph, supra note 29, at 43:
"[P]olice officers ... often have a finely honed probable cause - reasonable suspicion
sensibility .... This suggests that they have worked actively and successfully to understand the meaning of these terms .... " Id.
107. See Comment, supra note 64, at 634. The author suggests the effects of Leon
and Sheppard reveal the Court's motivation to "reduce the substantive protection afforded by the fourth amendment by denying a remedy even if there has been a constitutional violation." Id. The good-faith exception has indeed opened the door for more
judicial interpretation which may eventually swallow the rule.
108. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. at 906 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,
223 (1983)).
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used and that person must seek a lawyer to sue the police officer or
convince the officer's superior to discipline him.
It is therefore imperative that the exclusionary rule be replaced
by a viable alternative which carries an equivalent deterrent effect,
and not by an exception which serves only to further emasculate the
exclusionary rule while providing no off-setting salutary effect.
IV.

THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENT DETERRENCE

All previously-proposed alternatives to the exclusionary rule
suffer from the same deficiencies as the exclusionary rule itself: they
fail adequately to deter unlawful police conduct. In large part this
is because most of the proposals treat sanctions for violations as
independent of the underlying criminal defense. One of the few redeeming characteristics of the exclusionary rule is that both the violation of the crimninal defendant's rights and the underlying
criminal action are inextricably intertwined.
The following proposal keeps the desirable characteristics of
exclusion while also incorporating many of the best features of some
of the other proposed alternatives. The proposal would be applied
in the following stages:
A. A defendant in a criminal case makes a motion to suppress
evidence at least thirty days prior to trial on the ground that it was
obtained in violation of his constitutional rights.
B. The burden shifts to the prosecutor to show the evidence
was obtained in compliance with the fourth and fifth amendments.
C. If the court decides the evidence was illegally obtained, the
prosecutor has two options:
1. He can elect not to proceed further, in which case the
sanction of exclusion will be automatically imposed.
2. He can request a hearing at which he has an opportunity to present a proposed alternative sanction or compensation plan to the court. The burden is on the prosecutor
to show that the proposed sanction would have a deterrent
and remedial effect equivalent to exclusion. In determining the adequacy of the proposed sanction the court would
consider:
a) the degree of actual injury incurred;
b) the adequacy of any monetary compensation proposed as redress for actual injuries;
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c) the deterrent effect of imposed or proposed disciplinary measures;
d) the degree to which the proposed sanction is "proportional" to the violation;
e) the certainty with which proposed sanctions will
actually be imposed, including the meaningfulness of
any "guarantees" of imposition.
D. After a hearing, the court has three options:
1. It may reject the proposed sanction or compensation plan
because it lacks either a deterrent effect equivalent to exclusion, or
because compensation for the defendant victim of the injury is inadequate, or both. In such a situation, exclusion will automatically be
imposed.
2. It may accept the proposal which, with respect to compensation offers, will become immediately binding on the state or prosecuting entity to the same extent as a civil judgment. In a proposed
criminal prosecution of the offending officer, proof of actual indictment, or the filing of a criminal complaint against a police officer
prior to the point at which the evidence is introduced at trial of the
underlying case, will be required. If the criminal defendant has
complied with the requirement of filing his or her motion at least
four weeks prior to trial, any proposed administrative disciplinary
measures must actually be imposed prior to the point at trial when
the illegally-obtained evidence would be introduced. If the criminal
defendant has not complied with the thirty-day deadline, the filing
of an internal complaint with the sanctions sought stated on the
face of the complaint will be acceptable.
3. The court may conditionally reject the proposed sanctions,
but must indicate those areas in which it finds the plan deficient.
The prosecutor may have additional time to amend the proposed
plan, provided the plan is submitted prior to the introduction of the
evidence at trial. The key element of this alternative is that the issue
of sanctions is decided in the same proceeding as the underlying
criminal action. The effectiveness of the proposed sanctions therefore is determined by the same judge who is determining the legality
of the search.
The above proposal places the burden of deciding how to proceed on the prosecution. The prosecutor may decide exclusion
would not be fatal to his case, in which instance he or she need not
present an alternative plan. In other instances, the prosecutor may
decide the case is not important enough to merit the extra time and
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expense of submitting a plan, and concede exclusion even if it means
dismissal of the case. In short, the position of the prosecution will
never be worse than it is under existing law.
In the exceptional case when the ability to prosecute a serious
crime depends upon the use of illegally obtained evidence, the prosecutor may elect to propose a plan. In some situations, compensation for the the criminal defendant whose rights have been violated
would be an important part of a proposed plan for sanctions, °9 for
example, when a defendant has been physically harmed and has incurred hospital expenses, or when a home has suffered property
damage from an illegal search. However, the court should impose a
"victim's lien" on any proposed payments made to a criminal defendant. This would ensure that victims of any crime committed by
the defendant would be compensated for their injuries or damages
before funds are released to the defendant.
In addition, funds disbursed could be designated to off-set any
damages awarded in separate civil proceedings. At a criminal trial,
the award of compensation to the defendant for a rights violation
would in no way prejudice that defendant's right to bring a civil
proceeding. Any damages awarded to a defendant in a criminal
case would be pursuant to a voluntary offer by the state. The court
in the criminal case would simply accept or reject the proposed
sanction as an alternative to exclusion.
Often a prosecutorial decision to offer compensation would
have to be made in consultation with political authorities, such as a
city council or county commission. A governmental entity unwilling to provide adequate compensation would then have to explain
to its constituency the large number of exclusions of evidence in
cases within the jurisdiction. The taxpayer ultimately would have
to decide whether or not to pay the cost of illegal searches. Practical pressures would then be exerted on the police and prosecutors to
comply with the fourth and fifth amendments.110
In cases involving technical violations, such as the failure to
give a Miranda warning, sanctions might more appropriately be in
109. Cf Wilkey, supra note 81, at 228.
110. Cf. Wilkey, supra note 81, at 231: "Moreover, higher administrative officials
and irate taxpayers may be expected to react adversely to losses resulting from the misconduct of policemen and to do something about their training and exercise of responsibilities." Id. See also Spiotto, supra note 2, at 45 n.44: "Those who are required to pay
the bills incurred as a result of the violation of the citizen's rights are likely to exercise
stricter control over the actions of the individual police officer." Id.
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the form of internal discipline. A modest fine imposed directly
against a police officer earning a modest salary would surely provide
greater deterrent effect than excluding evidence in one of the hundreds of cases he handles."1 ' This might be no more onerous than
requiring a waiter to pay for any dishes he breaks, yet would provide a realistic deterrent.
Ultimately, it would be the combination of sanctions (such as
individual fines and suspensions, institutional payments of compensation, or initiation of criminal prosecutions) which would be considered by the court in determining deterrent and remedial effect.
Sanctions approved by trial courts would be subject to the same
appellate review as are present rulings on the exclusion of evidence.
Final review of the proposed sanctions would be made by the same
courts which have invited alternative means of deterring violation
of the rights of criminal defendants.
It is submitted that this proposed alternative conforms to the
constitutional parameters set forth in Calandra,"2 eliminating the
injustices and anomalies inherent in exclusion while at the same
time adhering to basic precepts of judicial integrity.

111. See Wilkey, supra note 81, at 227-28:
When appellate courts rule several years after the violation, their decisions are
not only years too late [to provide effective guidance to the police], but usually
far too obscure for the average policeman to understand. They are remote in
both time and impact on the policeman at fault. Immediate guidance to the
policeman as to his error, with an appropriatepenalty [emphasis added], is
obviously more effective in contrast to simply rewarding the criminal." Id.
112. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 347-48.

